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ENGINEERING AND TECHNICAL INTELLECTUALS IN UKRAINE UNDER CONDITIONS OF THE "CREAT TERROR" (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE KONSTANTYNOVSKYIS FAMILY)

Abstract

The purpose of the proposed article is to investigate the fate of representatives of engineering and technical intelligentsia of Ukraine in the conditions of Stalin's "Great Terror" through the lens of personal experience of the Konstantinovskys family representatives. The anthropologization of history is gaining in popularity, that allows us to explore certain periods and phenomena through the personal experience of direct participants and eyewitnesses. The methods of everyday life in the context of the person's (family members') personal experiences study in extreme conditions is used in research. Other methods include using memoirs of family members as a historical source of oral memoirs. Consideration of personal traumatic experience as a microhistorical plot, allows us to extrapolate it to the specifics of the macrohistorical level of the period.

The article analyzes the historiography of the problem of mass repression, which in general is significant. The novelty of the proposed material is to focus on representatives of one Jewish family of engineers Konstantinovsky. The character of the Great Terror and its consequences for Ukraine is being explored everywhere through the optics of the fate of a particular Jewish family of civil engineers.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainian residents, including Jews, have been repressed on charges of involvement in non-existent anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary organizations. Among the standard allegations against engineering, including Jews, were espionage in favor of England, France, Poland and other countries. Representatives of the Konstantinovsky family have been charged with cooperating with Polish intelligence and agents from

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Java (Indonesia). Particularly "aggravating" factor for Gregory and Herman Konstantinovsky was their non-partisanship. For example, representatives of this family can follow the tried and true simplified mechanism of repression.

Studying archival documents, memoirs provides insight into the fabrication of political affairs, the forms and methods of Soviet special services, and public sentiment. Much of the engineering and technical intelligentsia in fact was completely isolated. However, not only J. Stalin and his entourage are responsible for the number of casualties, but also thousands of "snitches" whose activity was "stimulated" by the atmosphere of fear and "war on all against all" as an integral part of the totalitarian political regime.

Keywords: repression, Great Terror, national minorities, Jews, engineering and technical intelligentsia, Gregory, Herman and Raisa Konstantinovsky.

Introduction. In the 30th years of the XX century. in the Soviet Union, the establishment of a total political regime continued that was accompanied by an increase in the activities of the repressive and punitive apparatus. In 1932, a policy of "indigenization" collapsed, symbolizing the end of the "flames" of Stalin's power with regions and national groups. The Great Terror of 1937 - 1938 concerned a considerable number of intellectuals, the military, representatives of different nationalities and social groups.

Tens of thousands of Ukrainian residents, including Jews, were harassed on charges of involvement in non-existent anti-Soviet counter-revolutionary organizations. A new concept of "enemy of the people" appeared in the socio-political vocabulary and life. The Stalinist regime encouraged total surveillance, defamation, and the spread of anonymous accusations that became commonplace in life. The search of the "enemies of the people" and "pests" was conducted among the intelligentsia and in all sectors of the economy. Under the particular watchful eye of special services, in the conditions of realization of Stalin's industrial "breakthrough", there was an engineering and technical intelligentsia.

The study of "Great Terror" and its consequences for Ukraine began after the declassification of documents of the former Soviet special services and materials of the top party-state leadership of the USSR from the beginning of Gorbachev's "perestroika". The theme of political repression gained popularity in the 1990s. Access to documents of previously closed archives, publication of various materials, diaspora

literature caused a kind of boom. Today, there are a number of publications (Kotzur V. (1998), Bilokon S. (2000), Sirochenko G. (2011), Vasylchuk G. (2008)) that have carried out a thorough analysis of historiography, including bibliographic reviews of the Great Terror . Among the most famous Ukrainian researchers of this period and phenomenon are S. Kulchitsky, Yu. Shapoval, O. Bazhan, G. Kasyanov, T. Vronskaya, V. Danilenko and others.

V. Danylenko's (Danylenko, 1991), G. Kasyanov's (Kasyanov, 1991, 1992), Y. Shapoval's (Shapoval Yu. I., 2001, 2007) monographs explored the policy of the CPSU governors regarding the use of prerevolutionary specialists and analyzed the mechanisms of repression against them. The prominent role in the documents that were introduced to the scientific circulation concerning repressions in general, and in particular directed against the representatives of the scientific and technical intelligentsia, belongs to O. Bazhan, the deputy editor-in-chief of the profile edition of the VUCHK - GPU - NKVD - KGB archives. Features of the organization and use of family hostage in the punitive practice of the Stalinist totalitarian regime, the analysis of its origins was suggested by T. Vronskaya in her research (Vronskaya, 2013). T. Rafalskaya's monograph "The Great Terror" in the Zhytomyr Region "(Rafalskaya, 2012) contains material about the bloody crimes of the Chekists in the region, whose distinctive feature was poly-ethnicity. That is why, as the author points out, the repression against national minorities in Zhytomyr Oblast has become very special. The Jewish population was also left "unattended" by the NKVD bodies.

Thus, we can say that the theme of "Great Terror" is well developed. At the same time, the opening of new archival holdings and the facilitation of access to these materials open new perspectives for researchers.

The novelty of the proposed material is to focus on representatives of one Jewish family – engineers Konstantinovsky. The use of historical anthropology, oral history (elements of memoirs), and everyday history also emphasize the relative novelty of the material.

The anthropologization of history becames popular, allowing us to explore certain periods and phenomena through the personal experience of direct participants and eyewitnesses. Therefore, **the main purpose** of the research is to study the fate of representatives of the engineering and technical intelligentsia of Ukraine in the conditions of Stalin's "Great

Terror" through the lens of personal experience of representatives of a particular family. Among other tasks the author has set out is the reconstruction of the components of the repressive actions of the totalitarian regime during 1937 - 1938 against the representatives of a particular social group on the example of the Jewish family of construction engineer Grigory (Hersh) Konstantinovsky.

Let us dwell on the analysis of events and political decisions that led to the unfolding of mass terror in the Soviet Union. Yu. Shapoval (Vasiliev, 2004, p. 36) was one of the first in the Ukrainian historiography to address the problem of the "personnel revolution", that is, large-scale repression against leaders of different levels. According to the information he cites in his study, on September 6, 1936, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) made a decision to release Henry Yagoda from his duties as a Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR and appointed Nikolai Yezhov, who remained secretary of the CPSU Central Committee (b) and the Chairman of the Party Control Commission, with the aim that he "give the nine-tenths of his time to the NKVD" (Shapoval, 2007, p. 76). According to Y. Shapoval, the choice of Stalin M. Yezhov was not accidental. He cites such a personnel decision by American historian Robert Tucker: "During the period of maximum rise in the wave of terror, only Stalin himself could have been the true head of the penal organs. However, as the formal chairman of the NKVD, he needed a person who could automatically fulfill his orders and wishes without unnecessary questions. Such person was Mykola Yezhov (Shapoval, 2007, p. 76).

According to O. Bazhan, the starting point of the Great Terror was the February-March plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) in 1937 at which J. Stalin demanded to "put an end to the activities of saboteurs, spies and saboteurs" (Bazhan, 2017, p. 6). A powerful wave of repression in the USSR, and in particular the USSR, was caused by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) "On Anti-Soviet Elements" of July 2, 1937, and a telegram by J. Stalin to the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, and the Central Committee of the Republican Communist Party. It suggested, based on the NKVD apparatus of the USSR, "to take into account all the kulaks and criminals who returned to their homeland, so that the most hostile of them were immediately arrested and shot in the course of

administrative proceedings through the three, and others less active, but all however, hostile elements would be rewritten and sent to the districts at the direction of the NKVD "(Bazhan O., 2017, p. 6).

The Great Purgatory, 1937-1938, was designed by the Stalinist leadership to rehabilitate Soviet society from unwanted persons. Among its causes, researchers of Stalin's terror often call the desire of the USSR leadership to destroy the so-called "fifth column" – the imaginary and real opponents of the communist regime. While highlighting other reasons, V. Vasiliev emphasizes the existence of contradictions between different groups of party, Soviet, economic leaders, the "center" and regions (Vasiliev, 2004, p. 36). The same study examines variants of the definition of "Great Terror". In particular, he gives an assessment of the historians M. Jung and R. Binner (Jung, Binner, 2003), who, on the basis of the study of the secret order No. 00447 and the technology of its execution, proposed the definition of "Great Terror" – "a concept that includes mass repression operations in August 1937 - November 1938" (Jung, Binner, 2003).

Among the main factors of the repressive policy was the desire of the top party leadership of the USSR to modernize the economy of the country in the short term, that took place on the backdrop of changing the outlook of the vast majority of the population. The implementation of an industrial breakthrough plan required considerable investment, the mobilization of various resources and the intensification of efforts. The traditional "personnel hunger" for the Soviet Union, the backwardness of the material and technical base, the lack of specialists with the necessary qualifications, the inability to solve the tasks outlined on their own, required the search for "guilty" ones. That is why "pests", "sabotagers", "enemies of the people" appeared who were made responsible for economic difficulties and miscalculations, accidents in industry and transport, mismanagement in agriculture, etc. as I. Chikalo notes (Chikalo, 2013, p. 81).

The economic troubles of everyday life were explained by the presence of an "internal enemy", which, of course, had to be fought, and this "struggle" was felt by all. This function was performed by demonstration repression and public hearings. One of the key tasks of the Bolshevik revolution was the social transformation of society, built on a class approach. He was then divided into two "warring" classes: the exploiters (representatives of the former nobility and the bourgeoisie) and those exploited (of course, workers and peasants). Between them, Soviet

ideologists suggested making a "stratum", which they called "the labor intelligentsia." Everyone who was assigned to the first category automatically turned into "enemies", "aliens". Belonging to the third category (it was the representatives of the technical intelligentsia) did not guarantee their perception of the new state as "their own". However, in the face of repression, belonging to "one's own" did not always turn into indulgence.

The implementation of the plan to search for "hostile elements" among representatives of the old technical intelligentsia began after the trial of defendants in the "mine case". The Chairman of the SSU of the USSR, V. Balytsky, emphasized that a "counter-revolutionary organization" had been exposed, which carried out "harmful work aimed at destroying our coal economy" (Bazhan, Podkur, 2013, p. 401). The mythical Donugol organization was a "Polish sabotage group", worked under the directives of the French Ministry of Defense and the French Embassy in Moscow and was affiliated with anti-Soviet circles in Germany (Bazhan, Podkur, 2013, 401).

In order to emphasize the scale of the "international conspiracy", mass arrests were made. More than 100 highly qualified engineers have been arrested at various enterprises in the industry, accused of being a non-existent organization.

From the SSU of the USSR to the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) on March 25, 1929, the "Intelligence of the Intellectual Intelligence" was sent, stating the presence in the intelligent circles of "hypocrisy and double-dealing, manifesting in the official expression of their full and absolute trust in the party and to the authorities at the same time ironic attitude and malicious ridicule in their circle of the main political and economic measures of the government ... "(Bazhan, Podkur, 2013, p. 402).

Stalin, in his speech at the April (1929) combined plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the CPSU (b), insisted that the "miners" had lurked in all branches of industry and were far from being identified. "Bourgeois harm," he concluded, "is one of the most dangerous forms of resistance against socialism" (Danilenko, Kasyanov, Kulchitsky, 1991, p. 301). Arrests were started among directors, chief engineers of metallurgical, machine-

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building, coke-chemical plants, managers of construction trusts, heads of collective farms and state farms.

T. Vronskaya emphasizes in her research that by promising the people a bright future, the new heads of state have consistently, on an unprecedented scale, displaced those social groups dominated by people with high property and educational qualifications, as well as representatives of national minorities, including those from national minorities and Jews (Vronskaya, 2013, p. 109). The fabrication of group cases by nationality led to the destruction of a considerable number of Poles, Germans, Ukrainians and representatives of other nationalities. Jews were arrested on charges of fabricated "national lines" and belonging to non-existent "hostile" organizations. There was no separate "Jewish" line, which was subjected to repression. Although, the documents were quite common in accusations of Zionism, cooperation with Zionist organizations, Jewish parties, which at the time, like any other than the Bolshevik, were banned. Other standard charges that have led to the arrests are cooperation with the English intelligence, and compliance with the instructions of the British intelligence services (Bazhan, 2017).

Among the reasons for declaring war on the Soviet Union, Hitler called the need to combat "Jew-Bolshevism". In anti-Semitic circles in different countries (as in the post-war USSR), information about the involvement of Jews, who held a large number of leading Soviet and party positions, in organizing mass repression was promoted. One of the tasks the author set out is to destroy such stereotypes and to investigate the fate of the Jews in the context of the so-called "Great Terror".

In examining the Jews' fate under the totalitarian regime, special attention should be paid to explaining the causes and motives of the punitive and repressive actions of the Soviet authorities. A characteristic feature of social life in the USSR in the second half of the 1930s, according to V. Vengerska, was the hidden struggle of the Stalinist leadership against "Jewish domination", which was manifested in the gradual restriction of the number of Jews in the bodies of state and party power, power structures (Vengerska, 2018). L. Berenstein cites the following sad statistics: in the interwar period, 264,000 Jews were convicted for political reasons in Ukraine, and another 87,000 were tried in various criminal cases. 70 thousand people and 35.9 thousand of the

families members of convicted Jews – "enemies of the people" – were expelled from Ukraine (Berenstein , 1996, p. 38).

On July 25, 1937, an order was launched against the Germans residing in the USSR by order of the NKVD USSR No. 00439. According to Y. Shapoval, M. Yezhov did not limit himself to this and repression of the Finns, Estonians, ordered the Bulgarians, Macedonians, Poles, Latvians, Greeks, Iranians, Harbinians (by "Harbinians" referring to the former Chinese-Eastern Railway employees and re-immigrants from Manzhou), Chinese and Romanians, both foreign nationals and citizens of the USSR. Sentencing in cases of arrested on "national lines" were made by the NKVD Commission of the USSR and the USSR Prosecutor's Office. Instead of investigative cases, lists (albums) for persons subject to repression were sent for consideration, in which local authorities briefly outlined the essence of the case, and indicated the article on which the arrested person was passing (Shapoval, 2001, p. 83). Objects of repression also became clergymen, "cultists", Zionists.

The Great Terror was directed in two directions: one by order of 00447 - against the peasants, the "kulaks", former party figures, priests, believers, etc. The second is against representatives of individual national groups. The most insane was the "Polish national operation". The impulse to it was issued by M. Ezhov on August 11, 1937. Order No. 00485 "On the fascist-insurgent, espionage, sabotage, defeat and terrorist activities of Polish intelligence in the USSR" (Shapoval, 2007, p.83).

Based on the processing of archival documents, O. Bazhan made estimates that 3003 people were arrested in Kyiv and the region on October 1, 1937, including 1713 of Polish, 791 of Ukrainians, 237 of Galician citizens, Jews - 114, others - 148. The officers of the Kyiv UNFCU "discovered and liquidated" 59 Polish spy-sabotage residences, 19 POV organizations, 32 sabotage-rebel groups, 101 Polish intelligence agents. In January 1938, according to Chekist statistics, 6524 people were arrested in the Kyiv region "along the Polish line". From this number, the NKVD of the USSR was sentenced on the special lists of 4954 persons (in the first category 4302 persons, in the second category 652 persons), "three" – 580 persons (in the first category – 198, in the second – 382 persons) (Bazhan, 2013, p. 8).

The researcher also notes that some of the people of the republic perceived mass political repression as a way for the ruling regime to stay in power. Mechanic shop technician of Dnipropetrovsk plant after Dzerzhinsky Sigismund Rudkovsky, in an interview with the Soviet special service agent Casimir, pointed to the reason for the persecution of the Poles: "The Soviet authorities is on the eve of the disaster, nowadays they are afraid of internal uproar and especially speeches by the Poles, they decided physically deal with them. Previously, we were only removed from responsible positions, but now this is not enough and we are imprisoned "(Bazhan, 2017, p. 16).

Many Jews were blamed on the "Polish line". Similar accusations were made against the well-known Kiev civil engineer Grigory Konstantinovsky. His son-in-law was a well-known art critic, artist and writer Leonid Volynsky (Rabinovich), who actively participated in the search for masterpieces of the Dresden Gallery during World War II. He was very interesting and multifaceted figure. The author has elaborated on some aspects of his biography in his previous publications (Hecha, 2017, 2019). Among the main sources used during the writing of the article were the testimonies and memoirs of daughter G. Konstantinovsky and wife L. Volynsky, Raisa Konstantinovskaya. They make it possible to reproduce both the personal experiences of people who were witnesses of the arrests of relatives, searches in their own homes, and the methods used by Soviet special forces in the execution of their plans of arrests.

Hryhoriy (Gersh) Veniaminovich Konstantinovsky was a well-known civil engineer in the 1930s, whose name, like most of the repressed in the Soviet Union in the 1930s, was erased from collective memory for a long period. And only after the destruction of the USSR, in Kiev, on the house on the street of Shota Rustaveli 23, in which resided civil engineer, his great-granddaughter was erected a plaque in honor of the prominent grandfather. G. Konstantinovsky's great-granddaughter is also a well-known person, she is the translator Elena Kostyukovich.

G. Kostantinovsky was born in 1885 in Zhytomyr in a Jewish family (Memoirs of Paradise, 2015). He graduated from the Kiev high school with a gold medal, which allowed him to enter the Kiev Polytechnic Institute, overcoming the limit of the "three percent" rate for Jews existing in tsarist Russia, and got the profession of civil engineer.

From 1920 until his arrest, he was part of the trade union of heavy industry construction workers. He traveled extensively across the country, building bridges, factories, government and residential buildings. Thus, under his project, a metallurgical plant was built in Dneprodzerzhinsk (Kamenskoe until 1936 and from 2016), a cement plant in Amvrosiivka and others (Kostyukovich, 2017).

To the time of his arrest, he worked as a chief engineer on the construction of the Government House in Kiev (the modern building of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine). The building of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR became the first object of the new Republican administrative center in Lipki, the formation of which was connected with the transfer of the capital of Ukraine from Kharkov to Kiev in 1934. The building was designed in 1935 by architects I. Fomin and P. Abrosimov. The building was originally intended for the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD), and the Council of People's Commissars (Radnarcom) was to be housed in the building currently occupied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine on Mykhailivska Square. However, when the plans for the construction of the governmental center changed and they refused to place it in the Upper city, the newly-completed NKVD (Government House of Ukraine in Kiev) was handed over to the Radnarkom for placement. O. Kostyuchok in his research states that one of the main reasons for the suspension of the project of the government quarter, the colossal waste that was discovered after the construction of the RNA buildings of the USSR and the NKVD of the USSR became apparent (Kostyuchok, 2013).

It can be assumed that Grigory Konstantinovsky's arrest caused an excess of the previous estimates for the construction of the Government House. The non-party factor has become an additional argument for accusations. From 1937 arrests in his environment started. His daughter Raisa Konstantinovskaya recalls that every arrival of his father from work brought new facts of arrests among Kyiv intellectuals of different ages and different nationalities. What happened, no one could understand (Konstantinovskaya's Memoirs, 2015). As the family had already undergone one arrest, the feeling of anxiety increased.

At the end of 1936, the Konstantinovsky family received reports of the arrest of their son Herman. He and his family lived in Voronezh and worked at a radio factory. It was in this city that, after graduation from the KPI, he was appointed to the position of head of the laboratory. The appointment of a young specialist to a managerial position reflected the Soviet realities – the lack of a sufficient number of specialists with higher education, and with a high degree of probability, the results of previous "purges".

In a very short time a closed trial of Herman Konstantinovsky was appointed in Voronezh. Only mother went there, they didn't allow relatives to enter the courtroom. As he passed by the audience in the courtroom, despite the security guard, he managed to toss a piece of paper wrapped in a small tube that contained small letters of innocence and words of farewell. A few minutes later the court was over pronouncing a sentence of 25 years of camps and 5 years of deprivation of rights under Articles 58-7 and 58-10, that is, harm and counter-revolutionary agitation. He was scheduled to be sent to Petrozavodsk for forestry (Konstantinovskaya's Memoirs, 2015).

According to his sister Raisa Konstantinovskaya, since the trial took place, there was a right to challenge the sentence. A lawyer was sent from Kyiv who found Herman in the Voronezh prison. It became known that he had been criminalized. The allegations related to the demands that he, as the head of the laboratory, made regarding the maximum accuracy in the drawings of the radio equipment. The content of the counter-revolutionary agitation he was allegedly engaged in was that the oranges imported from Java were better than that of the Soviet. And secondly, the authors of the report stated to the relevant authorities that Herman Konstantinovsky offered not to write in the announcement of the festive demonstrations (May 1 and November 7), the obligatory turnout, since that's how everyone will go. The absurdity of the allegations and sentencing demonstrates all the horror of the period, one careless word prompted agents and reporters to inform the NKVD staff, and they did not delay arrests. His deputy, who was a member of the party, and of course, applied for the position of head of the laboratory, became the author of the reports on Herman Konstantinovsky. The denunciation was signed by her. Unfortunately, R. Konstaninovskaya didn't remember her name, and she regretted about this.

Oddly enough, the efforts of the family and the lawyer were successful, and after a few months Herman Konstantinovsky, after many difficult procedures, returned with his family to Kiev completely gray,

even though he was still thirty years old at the time (Konstantinovskaya's Memoirs, 2015).

Grigory Konstantinovsky's fate was not so favorable. The materials of the archival criminal case contain detailed information on the arrest on December 30, 1937 of the engineer of the Industrial Construction of G. Konstantinovsky III Division of the UNHCR KGB in the Kiev region (CDAGO of Ukraine, F. 263, Op. 1, D. 46127, L. 14). Doing such "gifts" to people on the eve of the holidays probably brought great pleasure to those who made the decisions and to those who put them into practice. The family lived at Shota Rustaveli str., 23, apt. 12. The archival case contains information on the composition of the family and only the wife Elizabeth, who was 49 at that time, is mentioned there. As the daughter was already married, she did not appear as a family member (CSAGO of Ukraine, F. 263, Op. 1, D. 46127, L. 14, 14).

The detainee was charged with the traditional "espionage in favor of Poland". R. Konstantinovskaya recalls that at three o'clock in the morning a doorbell rang. People jumped out of all the rooms in the communal area and listened who they came for. They pronounced the name of Konstantinovsky. She ran to her father and began to wake him. They began a search in the room, took drawings and copies of previous projects, typewriter, clothes, money, took off the hand father's watch. Only great-grandfather's the engagement ring with the name "Lisa" inside, he removed himself and gave it to his daughter. The wedding ring, according to the narrator, is kept in the granddaughter's family. This is the only gold item that has not been exchanged for bread. When the girl asked where her father was being taken, she was silently given the investigator's phone number (Konstantinovskaya's Memoirs, 2015).

The next day, R. Konstantinovskaya met with an investigator at a polyclinic near Bessarabskiy Market, where the hotel was temporarily located. He submitted a warrant to receive a salary. They tried to reassure her by saying that she was married and she was not responsible for her father. When Raisa inquired about her father's arrest, she was told that she did not know who her father was talking to in Kamensky. The construction of the coke plant was carried out by the French, communicating with foreigners (through work and through an interpreter) became the reason for the arrest (CSAGO of Ukraine, F. 263, Op. 1, D. 46127, L. 14).

Familiarity with the case allows us to track the mechanism of formation / fabrication of charges in the industrial field. The myth of the power of the USSR was formed after the Second World War. The belief that the Soviet Union was able to solve the most complex industrial problems on its own without the support of "hostile" countries, which were labeled as ideological opponents in Soviet ideology, did not correspond the realities. Engineering work on the construction of a coke plant (as well as other industrial enterprises) was technologically complicated, so a considerable amount of capacity was built under the supervision of engineers from the USA, Belgium, France, Germany. Ehe labor supply was relatively satisfactory but the provision of engineering work was indeed catastrophic. As of July 1, 1930, there were only two Soviet engineers at all Koksobud construction in the entire Soviet Union (Southern Ukraine, Urals, and Siberia) (Central State Administration of Ukraine, F. 1, Op. 20, D. 3127. L. 85).

The investigation established that in 1929, during the period of his work as chief engineer for the construction of a coke plant in Kamensky, G. Konstantinovsky contacted a representative of a foreign firm, an engineer of Schulte (unnamed), who seemed to be an agent of "Polish intelligence". The Soviet construction workers and designers gained experience in the construction of the first coke plants. However, there were no Poles on the construction. This fact did not prevent the accusation that in Kamensky G. Konstantinovsky was recruited for espionage activities in favor of Poland.

He allegedly received from Schulte the task of collecting and transmitting materials for the construction of the coke plant for "prospecting", as well as promoting the malicious design projects, seeking their installation at the plant. The case contained allegations that in 1929 - 1930, coal crushers were installed (for the purpose of damage), in underground bunkers, at a depth of eight meters above the water horizon. This has led to high costs and delayed completion of construction.

The prosecution claimed that in 1933 during his position as the head of the design office of the Bolshevik Plant Design Bureau in Kyiv G. Konstantinovsky also provided Schulte with espionage information about the capacity of the first Bolshevik machine-building plant and production facilities that were built on its territory (CDAGO of Ukraine, F 263, Op. 1, D. 46127, L. 14).

It seemed that Schulte had come from Dnepropetrovsk to Kiev to obtain this information. G. Konstantinovsky allegedly informed him of new constructions and gas storage facilities in Kyiv. In 1935 Schulte's trusted person – Kretzman-Krenberg visited G. Konstantinovsky and he allegedly received plans for the building of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) B and a list of other buildings in Kiev.

As noted in the case, in order to activate espionage activities, he recruited engineer Zelenyov, from whom he received plans for the garage of the CEC of the USSR and the premises of the State Bank. These materials were transmitted to Schulte via Kretzman-Krenberg during his last visit to Kiev in 1935 (CDACO of Ukraine, F. 263, Op. 1, D. 46127, L. 37).

Testimonies against G. Konstantinovsky were given by the arrested Zelenyov and Slyusarevsky. All the manifestations of "pestilence" were, at most, far-fetched, and in some places - outright absurd.

G. Konstantinovsky was accused of espionage under Article 54-6 Part 1 of the Criminal Code of the Ukrainian SSR. The investigation did not last long - already on February 4, 1938, Grigory Veniaminovich was sentenced to death by the decision of three of the Kiev Regional Directorate of the NKVD. Signed the verdict: Operated by III Division of UGB UNHCR, Junior Lieutenant Zhutov, Head of III Division of UGB UNHCR Captain Rogol, approved by Deputy Chief UNHCR in the Kiev region Major I. Babich (TSAGO Ukraine, F. 263, Op. 1). He acknowledged the accusation of a "Polish spy" (apparently to be tortured less), but did not deny anyone. The verdict was enforced on February 16, 1938 in Kiev, most likely the place of his burial is the territory of the former NKVD special unit of the USSR in Bykivnia Forest (nowadays – within the territory of the National Historical and Memorial Reserve "Bykivnia Tombs"). G. Konstantinovsky at the time of the shooting was 52 years old. For a long time the relatives did not know about his fate.

To the materials the resolutions of the assembly of the collective and the party center were attached. It contained the unanimous conclusions to severely punish the "exposed enemy of the people." In addition, mutual accusations, slander and slander are common in recorded speeches. The complaints outlined the nature of the relationship, when bills were displayed for "vigilance" and negative human traits, such as envy, treachery, betrayal, were raised to the

surface. In court proceedings, such documents became conclusive evidence and were not verified for objectivity.

Many years later, the family issued an untrue death certificate, which stated that G. Konstantinovsky was serving a sentence in a labor camp and died on March 4, 1943 of heart paralysis (Kostyukovich, 2017), which was untrue.

In 1957 Gregory Konstantinovsky was posthumously rehabilitated for lack of a crime. In the rehabilitation decree, in particular, it was stated:

"The check established that there are no data on G. Konstantinovsky's belonging to the agency of foreign intelligence agencies in the relevant bodies, and G. Konstantinovsky was unreasonably prosecuted" (Kostyukovich, 2017).

His daughter, Raisa Konstantinovskaya, mentioned that in 1937 she wrote a thesis, drew, and her husband, the artist L. Volynsky, assisted her.

"The arrest of my father, whom I loved dearly, made it very difficult for me. I'm ill. I stopped eating, I got sick of food, I stopped sleeping. By three o'clock at night, we did not lie down as if we were waiting for the arrests to be repeated. So, I started having insomnia, which is probably for the whole life. I have not slept without sleeping pills since then ... In 1938 I became a master degree. I came home ... I will never forget the state of emptiness ... My father wanted me to graduate from college. He would be happy ... But the house was empty" (Raisa's Memoirs, 2015).

The example of representatives of this family can be traced to the tried and tested simplified mechanism of repression:

- $\ arrests \ were \ made \ at \ night, \ on \ holidays;$
- the reason for the arrest was not reported to the arrested and the family;
 - the investigation took place within 10 days;
 - the prosecutor did not participate in the trial;
 - cases were considered "two" or "three";
 - charges of "espionage" in favor of a foreign state;
 - hanging the label "enemy of the people";
- as a rule, the defendant did not have the right to a lawyer, the verdict was not appealable;
 - families did not have information about the fate of their relatives.

In 2010, R. Konstantinovskaya, at the age of ninety-seven years wrote the following lines: "My memory brings me back to those fatal years. And now there is so much talk about Stalin's repression ... But it is not said in full voice about the guilt of the millions who lived then, in the thirties, involved in the terrible crime of the century, and no one apologizes for their actions, their parents.

How many people want to reclaim the past, forgetting, perhaps, what had happened then. After all, it did not affect the elect, but all, absolutely all population groups, including children. My God, how many different houses of worship were built, except for the sins to be forgiven? As a pity for the father, for the parents, for all those who were so barbarously destroyed, they were deprived of life in the prime of their years, young, beautiful, intelligent, talented ... I cannot forget, I cannot forgive ... "(Kostyukovich, 2017).

From these words, one can understand the depth of the traumas suffered by members of the families of the repressed. They do not just condemn the system, but every person involved in its operation in such a inhumane format.

Studying the materials of archival investigative documents gives an idea of the mechanisms of fabrication of political cases, the forms and methods of activity of the Soviet special services. The terror of the 1930's was directed against the entire population of Ukraine, regardless of ethnic or social characteristics. First of all, the largest social group that was persecuted was the intelligentsia. Konstantinovsky's family has had many trials, the most tragic of them being repression. The example of representatives of this family demonstrates that the most horrific wave of repression began in 1937, not in vain this period was described as "Great Terror". In 1936 there was the possibility of acquittal, especially if the prosecution was heard in court. A year before the largescale "purges" there was an opportunity to write an appeal, retained the right to appeal the sentence, and as in the case of Herman Konstantinovsky, to return home. But such an exception only confirms the rule and the awfulness of the system. The rescue of his son did not provide security for his father, whose case was also tried in court, but as early as 1937, after considering the cases of "threes" or "twos" the possibility of any avoidance of the massacre did not remain at all.

Conclusions. Analyzing the nature of the repression of the Soviet authorities against the technical intelligentsia in the Great Terror of 1937 – 1938, we must admit that at that time they acquired a particularly mass character and cruelty, brought to the point of absurdity. As a result, a significant part of the engineering and technical intelligentsia was in fact isolated, in an atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, which had transformed into millions of prisoners of Stalin's camps (Slipushchenko, 2014, p. 25). However, not only J. Stalin and his entourage are responsible for the number of casualties, but also thousands of "snitches" whose activity was "stimulated" by the atmosphere of fear and the desire to be served, as well as the most disgusting human feelings.

Obviously, economic problems were not the root cause of the Great Terror, but the totalitarian regime needed support from fear, and the search for "enemies" turned into an obsession. The absence of a quick effect from the realization of an industrial "breakthrough" required the search for "guilty" in economic troubles. Not only did the Great Terror damage the economy and defense capability of the USSR, but it also had a negative effect on the moral and psychological state of Soviet society the day before and during the initial period of World War II.

Studying the history from below, the personal traumatic experience of functioning undemocratic political regimes is a promising area of research that allows the official history to be filled with the live voices of ordinary people.

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Геча Олена. ІНЖЕНЕРНО-ТЕХНІЧНА ІНТЕЛІГЕНЦІЯ УКРАЇНИ В УМОВАХ «ВЕЛИКОГО ТЕРОРУ» (НА ПРИКЛАДІ ПРЕДСТАВНИКІВ РОДИНИ КОНСТАНТИНОВСЬКИХ) Анотація

Метою запропонованої статті є дослідження долі представників інженерно-технічної інтелігенції України в умовах сталінського «Великого терору» скрізь призму персонального досвіду представників родини Константиновських. Антропологізація історії набуває все більшої популярності, що дозволяє досліджувати певні періоди і явища через персональний досвід безпосередніх учасників та очевидців. В дослідженні використовувались методи історії повсякденності в контексті вивчення особистих переживань людини (членів родини) в екстремальних умовах. Серед інших методів — використання в якості історичного джерела

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усних спогадів, мемуарів представників конкретної родини. Розгляд персонального травматичного досвіду як мікроісторичного сюжету, дозволив екстраполювати його на специфіку макроісторичного рівня періоду.

В статті проаналізовано історіографію проблеми масових репресій, яка в цілому є значною. Новизною запропонованого матеріалу є зосередження уваги на представниках однієї єврейської родини— інженерів Константиновських. Характер «Великого терору» та його наслідки для України досліджується скрізь оптику долі конкретної єврейської родини інженера-будівельника.

Десятки тисяч мешканців України, зокрема євреїв, були репресовані з обвинуваченням у причетності до неіснуючих антирадянських контрреволюційних організацій. Серед стандартних обвинувачень, які висувались проти представників інженерно-технічної інтелігенції, зокрема євреїв, — шпигунство на користь Англії, Франції, Польщі та інших країн. Проти представників родини Константиновських висувались звинувачення у співпраці з «польською розвідкою» та агентами з острова Ява (Індонезія). Особливо «обтяжуючим» фактором для Григорія та Германа Константиновських стала їх безпартійність. На прикладі представників цієї родини можна прослідкувати відпрацьований та максимально спрощений механізм репресій.

Вивчення матеріалів архівно-слідчих документів, спогадів та мемуарів дає уявлення про механізми фабрикації політичних справ, форми і методи діяльності радянських спецслужб та суспільні настрої. Значна частина інженерно-технічної інтелігенції фактично виявилася в повній ізоляції. Проте, відповідальність за кількість жертв несуть не лише Й. Сталін та його оточення, а й тисячі «стукачів», активність яких «стимулювала» атмосфера страху та «війни всіх проти всіх», як невід'ємна складова тоталітарного політичного режиму.

Ключові слова: репресії, «великий терор», національна меншина, євреї, інженерно-технічна інтелігенція, Григорій, Герман та Раїса Константиновські.

Elena Hecha. INŻYNIERNO-TECHNICZNA INTELIGENCJA UKRAINY W WARUNKACH WIELKIEGO TERRORU (NA PRZYKŁADZIE STAŁYCH PRZEDSTAWICIELI RODZINY KONSTANTYNOWSKICH)

Streszczenie

Celem zaproponowanego artykułu jest badanie losu przedstawicieli Inżynierno-technicznej inteligencji Ukrainy w warunkach stalinowskiego

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«Dużego terroru» pzrez pryzmat osobistego doświadczenia przedstawicieli rodziny Konstantynowskich. Antro pologizowanie historii zdobywa coraz większej popularności, co pozwala badać pewne okresy i zjawiska przez osobiste doświadczenie bezpośrednich uczestników i świadków. W badaniu wykorzystywały się metody historii powszedniości w kontekście studiowania osobistych przeżyć człowieka (członków rodziny) w ekstremalnych warunkach. Posrud innych metod – użycie w jakości historycznego źródła ustnych wspomnień, memuarów przedstawicieli konkretnej rodziny. Rozpatrzenie osobistego urazowego doświadczenia jak mikrohistorycznej fabuły, pozwolił ekstrapolować jego na specyfikę makrohistorycznego poziomu.

W artykule przeanalizowano dziejopisarstwo problemu masowych represji, który na ogół jest znaczny. Nowością zaproponowanego materiału jest skupienie uwagi na przedstawicielach jednej żydowskiej rodziny inżynierów Konstantynowskich. Charakter «Dużego terroru» i jego skutki dla Ukrainy bada się przez optykę losu konkretnej żydowskiej rodziny inżynierabudowniczego.

Dziesiątki tysięcy mieszkańców Ukrainy, w szczególności Żydów, były represowany zoskarżeniem w związku do niebyłych antyradzieckich kontrrewolucyjnych organizacji. Wśród standardowych oskarżeń, które wysuwały się przeciw przedstawicieluw inżynierno-technicznej inteligencji, w szczególności Żydów, – szpiegostwo na korzyść Anglii, Francji, Polski i innych krajów. Przeciw przedstawicieluw rodziny Konstantynowskich wysuwały się oskarżenia we współpracy z «polskim wywiadem» i agentami z wyspy Jawa (Indonezja). Zwłaszcza «obciążającym» czynnikiem dla Grigorija i Hermana Konstantynowskich stała się ich bezpartyjność. Na przykładzie przedstawicieli tej rodziny można dopilnować zużyty i maksymalnie uproszczony mechanizm represji.

Studiowanie materiałów archiwno-śledczych dokumentów, wspomnień i memuarów daje pojęcie o mechanizmach fabrykacji politycznych spraw, formach i metodach działalności radzieckich służb specjalnych i społecznych nastrojach. Znaczna część inżynierno-technicznej inteligencji faktyczno okazała się w pełnej izolacji. Jednak, odpowiedzialność za ilość ofiar ponoszą nie tylko J. Stalin i jego otoczenie, ale i tysiące «oszuści», aktywność których «stymulowała&» atmosfera lęku i «wojny wszystkich przeciw wszystkich», jak niezbywalny składnik totalitarnego politycznego reżimu.

Kluczowe słowa: represje, «Duży terror», narodowa mniejszość, Żydzi, inżynierno-techniczna inteligencja, Grigorij, Herman i Raisa Konstantynowski.

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