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**THE COERCION TO VIOLENCE OF PARTY-SOVIET NOMENCLATURE OF  
WESTERN REGIONS OF UKRAINE IN 1944-1946**

The style of the work and behavior of the party officials of the highest rank on the territory of the western regions of Ukraine in the early postwar years is characterized. The description is given in terms of the particularly historical conditions of their professional development in an administrative-command system. The special attention is paid to both direct and indirect methods of the state to force the nomenclature party officials to violence.

**Keywords:** party officials, VKP(b), the Soviet power, the secretary of the regional committee, professional behavior, the nomenclature.

**1944-1946 ЖЫЛДАРДАҒЫ УКРАИНАНЫҢ БАТЫС ӨНІРЛЕРІНІҢ  
ПАРТИЯЛЫҚ-КЕҢЕСТІК НОМЕНКЛАТУРАСЫН  
ЗОРЛЫҚ-ЗОМБЫЛЫҚҚА МӘЖБҮРЛЕУ**

Мақалада басқарушылық-әкімшілік жүйе шеңберінде кәсіби тұрғыдан қалыптасудың нақты тарихи жағдайы есепке алына отырып, соғыстың алғашқы жылдарындағы Батыс Украинаның жоғары дәрежелі партиялық шенеуніктерінің жұмыс істеу мәнері мен мінез-құлқы сипатталады. Мемлекет тарапынан тікелей немесе жанама әдіс арқылы номенклатуралы лауазымды тұлғаларды зорлық-зомбылыққа мәжбүрлеуге баса назар аударылады.

**Түйін сөздер:** партиялық шенеуніктер, ВКП(б), кеңестік билік, облыстық комитеттің хатшысы, кәсіби мінез-құлық, номенклатура.

**ПРИНУЖДЕНИЕ К НАСИЛИЮ ПАРТИЙНО-СОВЕТСКОЙ НОМЕНКЛАТУРЫ  
ЗАПАДНЫХ ОБЛАСТЕЙ УКРАИНЫ В 1944-1946 ГОДАХ**

В статье характеризуется стиль работы и поведения партийных чиновников высокого ранга западных областей Украины в первые послевоенные годы, исходя из конкретно-исторических условий их профессионального становления в рамках командно-административной системы. Акцентируется внимание на принуждении номенклатурных должностных лиц к насилию со стороны государства прямым или косвенным способом.

**Ключевые слова:** партийные чиновники, ВКП(б), советская власть, секретарь обкома, профессиональное поведение, номенклатура.

The latest stage of Ukrainian state-building is full of very complex systemic problems. The state of the armed-political confrontation in the East and the occupation of the Crimea have become not only a challenge to the material and resource potential of our state, but also the ideological potential of our people. The century of experience of coexistence in the imperial space proves that victory is a priori possible only

if the «Russian peace» is superseded beyond the limits of the public consciousness of Ukrainian citizens. In the context of the above, the relevance of the problem we are investigating lies not only in area of its scientific knowledge, but also in practical significance. Integration of temporarily occupied Ukrainian regions into a national administrative-territorial structure is impossible without taking into account the human factor. The quality and depth of the processes of Ukrainization (in the broadest sense of the word) of government officials who must carry it out directly depends on the level of their professionalism and patriotism. Therefore, experience and lessons learned from the process of Sovietization of the western regions of Ukraine carried out by the Bolshevik authorities in the first post-war years, as never before, should be useful to modern Ukrainian politics.

In recent decades, the problem of integration of the Western Ukrainian region into the Soviet state-political system is actively investigated both by domestic and foreign researchers in various aspects - economic, socio-political, cultural-educational, religious, etc. However, the topic of activity of the Soviet party nomenclature of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR, which, in fact, was the main subject of this process, still remains outside the scope of scientific research. It is indirectly covered in the works of Ukrainian scholars, whose subject of study covers the party and state governing bodies of the Ukrainian SSR in 1945-1964. In particular, the typological portrait of the representative of the ruling structures of the 1940s, including those in the Western Ukrainian region, is considered in the scientific works of P. Kyrydon [1: 2], V. Krupyna [3], A. Shteynle [4], G. Starodubets [5]. It is worth noting that in the vast majority of studies, the Soviet party nomenclature is considered to be the subject of Sovietization processes, whereas during the period we have identified, it simultaneously acted as an object of pressure of the state, coercion to violent actions, in particular, regarding local population. As a result, the purpose of our article is to characterize the style of work and behavior of party officials of the highest rank on the territory of western regions of Ukraine in the first post-war years, taking into account the particular historical conditions of their professional activity, and to determine the purpose, forms and methods of forcing of party-state officials to violence.

The professional incipience of the representatives of the highest party-Soviet officials in the western regions of Ukraine in 1944-1946 took place under conditions of the formation of the Stalinist regime of political power, firmly concealed in the totalitarian system. Analyzing Stalinism as the model of social designing, the Russian philosopher Andrei Miedushevskyi believes that in the period of its existence, «the whole society was built as a barracks or a prison, where various types of prisoners had a special detention regime, and the right to life in the struggle for existence became the main privilege». According to the scientist, «such a mechanism included the division of society into two main categories - the first, so-called Soviet people, constructed as a

conformist support of the regime and was subject to social adaptation on a new basis; the second, defined by the general notion of «anti-Soviet elements» or «enemies of the people», was recognized as incapable of being adapted and was subject to destruction» [6, p.14]. A more «plastic» part of society tried to adapt to the new challenges of time, taking the position of «individual survival» or «effective social adaptation».

In terms of the Stalinist totalitarian regime, such a position could not be limited to the passive perception of Soviet reality and simple demonstration of loyalty to power without active participation in various rituals of a socializing nature - meetings, gatherings, parades, conferences, etc. The younger generation of the Bolsheviks of the 1930s, who, in fact, later realized the process of the second Sovietization of the western regions of Ukraine, was used directly or indirectly by the regime as an instrument for the implementation of repressive policy. But beyond this, they had the opportunity to gain experience of career growth, in accordance with the prevailing criterion of the undeniable devotion to the Party and to Stalin personally.

The overwhelming majority of them originated from the working-peasant environment and tore their ways to nomenclature officials, as a rule, without crossing the doorstep of a higher or even secondary school. With no proper education, no life and professional experience, they developed the skills of the hardware representative from the start. The Bolshevik-Soviet leaders of the West Ukrainian regions of 1944-1946 were typical representatives of the new generation, who studied history not from the textbooks, but created it with their own hands, with their direct participation. Their active youth of the Komsomol passed under the slogans of fighting with: kulaks, church, trotskists, bukharins, agents of imperialist investigation, etc. Therefore, violence was perceived as a natural component of the Soviet political system at the substantive level of their consciousness.

The atmosphere of hating, fear, espionage and suspicion was consciously imposed in society and reigned not only among ordinary citizens of the Soviet Union but also among the nomenclature officials of all (up to the highest) levels of party-Soviet power. The overwhelming majority of them in one way or another, participated in the ritual action of sacrifices to the «bloody Molokh» during the Great Terror, and formed in themselves the instinct of aggressive rejection of «another», «unlike», who stood out from the general society. The practice of violence promoted the spread of the feeling of insecurity, mutual mistrust and growing of a personality of a totalitarian type.

An authoritarian, even dictatorial style of management accompanied them at all stages of career growth. Rising from the «lower classes», they were forced to constantly buckle under the system, prove their «proletarian» and devotion to the Party, constantly being in danger of falling into the ranks of «enemies of the people». Therefore, the cultivation of a rigid, strong-willed and impassable leader in themselves was determined by immanent necessity of party functionaries to conquer and maintain a

high social status.

The selection and placement of personnel of the party-Soviet nomenclature in the western regions of Ukrainian SSR during the investigated period was carried out considering the specifics of the military-political situation which developed there at the time of the deployment of the second Sovietization process and, accordingly, the potential of candidates for appropriate positions to lead and effectively manage this process. Therefore, the first secretaries of four of the six regional committees of the KP(b)U in the western regions during the war were whether active participants in the Soviet partisan movement: V.A. Begma (first secretary of the Rivne regional committee of the KP(b)U) led the partisan union and had the rank of general -major, S. Oleksenko (first secretary of the Drohobych regional committee of the KP(b)U) headed the Kamianets-Podilskyi partisan union); or entered the Military Councils of individual fronts: I.S. Grushetskyi (the first secretary of the Lviv regional committee of the KP(b)U) was a member of the Military Council of the 2nd Ukrainian Front in the rank of Major General; M.V. Slon (first secretary of the Stanislav regional committee of the KP(b)U) - the Military Council of the 18th Army of the First Ukrainian Front in the rank of colonel. Thus, each of them had the experience of the military leadership and, accordingly, a peculiar set of moral and professional features and psychological attitudes.

The party officials often continued to use military methods of management in their practical work: rigid discipline, dogmatic rejection of «other thought», unconditional submission to senior management, etc. In relations with subordinates there was excessive administrative working style, neglect of their thoughts, permanent insulting of the employees, rough, sometimes vulgar way of communicating with them. The experience tested by the Bolshevik authorities during the 1930s, based on the so-called «system of hierarchical dictatorship» was brought to the management practice in the western regions. Such a management structure «acted as the battleground between the leader and the subordinates, in which the boss (dictator) used force and coercion in relation to his subordinates to limit their opportunistic behavior» [7, p.340]. In terms of this structure, violence was perceived as a natural component of the behavioral standard of a senior manager.

An example of the professional behavior of the party leaders of Lviv region in 1945 - the secretaries of the regional committee of the KP(b)U I. Grushetskyi, P. Hapochka, Nikolaienko, is a bright confirmation of the above. Their style of work even became the subject of criticism at the level of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U [8, ark.41,45]. It is about interpersonal business relations of five secretaries of the Lviv Regional Party Committee - Grushetskyi, Hapochka, Nikolaienko, Mazepa and Burlak, who worked together since July 27, 1944. The main flaw in the work of I. Grushetskyi, on his colleagues' views, was the fact, that, as Major-General in retirement, he, first of all, «in the first days of his work in the regional committee always

wore an army uniform», thus demonstrating the superiority of his status not only with nomenclature position, but also with the direct involvement in the cohort of the high officers of the Red Army, so called «heroes of the war.» Secondly, «in practice he used military style of managing and command tone for subordinates, instead of collegial work of all secretaries» [8, ark.44]. For a long time, he was not called the secretary of the regional committee, but simply - Major General. Communicating with colleagues, he allowed himself a rude and public demonstration of disrespect for the thoughts of others. It was a common practice that regional meetings of the secretaries of district committees of the KP(b)U and chairmen of district committees «turned into gross interrogations, threats and insults in the address of speakers» [9, ark.61]. In our opinion, I. Grushetsky was a typical example of the personification of the new figure of the post-war era, «endowed with the winner's wit, who was convinced of the special attitude towards him, given his merits to his homeland and the moral and physical losses» [1, p.82].

Local party functionaries were not satisfied with this style of I. Grushetsky's leadership, as well as the fact that he took most of his work, rarely consulted with the secretaries of the regional committee on certain issues, which actually restricted their initiative and even initiative of some officials of city party organizations. The second secretary of the Lviv Regional Party Committee P. Hapochka was his main opponent. Unlike his direct supervisor, he was educated person, often «sitting in the regional committee, having literature around him, and wrote scientific works» [8, ark.44]. The point of boiling in relations between party secretaries was the speech by I. Grushetskyi at the city meeting of the Polish elite of Lviv. Then he «admitted the lack of tactics - in a rude form and in an elevated tone, he declared: «Part of the Polish elite does nothing, but only leads the dogs, which spoil the air, in the city» [8, ark.43]. Indignant by such behavior by the first secretary of the regional committee of the KP(b)U P. Hapochka, in the presence of the employees of the party apparatus, called I. Grushetskyi a fool, who is impossible to work with.

The conflict got such a resonance that it was forced to react by M.S. Khrushchev. The Central Committee of the KP(b)U took the position of I. Grushetskyi's defense. He was pointed out the flaws in the work, offered to change the style of management to a more democratic, and the second secretary of the regional committee P. Hapochka was dismissed from the position in order to «improve the work of the Lviv Regional Committee». It is obvious, that the problem was solved in favor of I. Grushetskyi, referring to the fact that he supposedly reconsidered his mistakes and changed the methods of management of the regional committee. Actually, the official decision of the authorities could not be different, because the administrative-command system required rigid performers of the will of the «higher authorities». I. S. Grushetskyi was one of its products, and therefore – its true defender.

In general, such style of leadership caused a hidden dissatisfaction from the subordinates, but though, on the other hand, was perceived as an example to follow. Thus, the personnel secretary of the Lviv Regional Committee, Klimov, also distinguished himself by his «rude and impudent». He was accused of «lack of culture, education and humanity in his work. He does not accept visitors, as a rule, he often expels them from the office, offends them. He is not rude only with visitors, but also, he offends his co-employees. He can sit behind a closed door, while visitors are waiting for him in the corridor»[10, ark.49].

A similar style of management of higher party-Soviet officials in the post-war period was rather typical. On the one hand, it can be explained by the certain ethical and moral level of education, which was retranslated into appropriate behavior manners and communication. On the other hand, there is an internal need for a permanent demonstration of the “owner’s” own status, both to subordinates, and, moreover, to ordinary citizens. Therefore, high officials often allowed themselves at their discretion to determine the scope of the working time, the range of rights and obligations, etiquette rules, as, for example, in the case of I. Hrushetskyi.

The nomenclature officials of the lower ranks behaved themselves similarly. It is clear that the answer to the question: «Why was such behavior of party leaders possible?», cannot be unambiguous. But undoubtedly, it is determined by the very existence of the party-state management system of «hierarchical dictatorship» with a «little dictator» with different volume of influence at each level in the USSR. On the one hand, they were united by the willingness to unconditionally obedience and lack of initiative, and on the other - the desire to compensate the sense of «subjugation» by demonstrating their power over the «lower» official. The uniqueness of this system also consisted in the fact that, along with the party ticket, the nomenclature official was entitled to use a kind of «moral and legal backlash», and its measure depended on the significance of the position, the quality of the «track record», etc. This circumstance contributed to the production of nomenclature officials, «for which there was no motivation to not allow official misconduct, respect for legality and immunity according to bureaucracy in communicating with citizens, bribery, nepotism, etc.» [1, p.81].

The fundamental principles of the Soviet system of governance, laid down in 1920-1930, have not changed in the post-war period. On the contrary, in extreme conditions of brutal armed confrontation in the western Ukrainian region, they reached their maximum ripeness and found their appearance in extreme forms of violence and authoritarianism. In practice, this was manifested by excessive cruelty to people around not only from the representatives of punitive organs, but also from the party functionaries.

The Stalinist regime consciously and purposefully carried out a «selection» of its personnel, including on the basis of the potential manifestation of the «rigidity of



character» (which was very close to cruelty) in relation to political opponents and «class enemies». J. Stalin stressed «The classless society needs to be conquered by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat», «through the unfolding of the class struggle, through the destruction of classes, through the elimination of the remnants of the capitalist classes in the battles with the enemies both internal and external» [11, p.350]. The aggressive rhetoric of the public speeches of the leader of the Soviet state was actively copied by party-state officials of all levels and was used by them as a demonstration of their loyal and true dedication to the Bolshevik regime and permanent readiness to defend its values in any way.

An analysis of the content and style of writing of official party-state documents of Stalin's period gives a reason to consider them as an indirect tool of coercion of nomenclature officials to violence. For example, in the decree of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U «On the Elimination of the Remnants of Gangs of Ukrainian-German Nationalists in the Western Regions of the Ukrainian SSR» as of July 24, 1945, the necessity to oblige the secretaries of the regional and district committees of the KP(b) U, along with the heads of «security agencies», «in every district to develop specific plans of the complete elimination of every gang group separately,» «to strengthen the chekist and military work» «to not leave any gang manifestation without any investigation, to detect the gangsters and their followers and to arrest and judge them immediately», «to strengthen the vigilance», «the Communists and the Young Communists should strain their forces even more and completely eliminate the remnants of gangs in the near future» [12, p.170-174]. As we can see, the document is filled with lexical turns of the «language of totalitarianism», «repressive language». Words and phrases such as «detect», «eliminate», «strain the force», «gangsters», «Ukrainian-German bourgeois nationalists», etc. are used not only for information purposes, but moreover, they contain estimating statements and are expressively colored. Their permanent usage in the Stalinist discourse contributed to the formation of certain ideological settings and appropriate stereotypes in behavior of the party and Soviet officials of the western regions of Ukraine.

The analysis of archival documents gives reasons to arrive at the conclusion about wide spread of the cases of application by representatives of the authorities the baseless violence against the local population in indicated period. Thus, in a Roman-chuk's letter, some of the officials of the executive committee of the district council of deputies of the workers of one of the district centers of Ternopil region addressed to the personnel secretary of the Central Committee of the KP(b)U O. Kyrychenko, we read: «The one who goes on the deal with banderivtsi (the head of the district executive committee and the secretaries of the district committee – G.S.), he/she lives very well, because in the villages they can catch geese and chickens from the families of banderivtsi and can take them for themselves. They make ugly during operations. Everyone

here is so used to this powerlessness and mess, to these methods of easy profit, that you will not find anyone to support you in your will to destroy it». A woman's special indignation aroused with the words of one of the deputies of the first secretary of the regional committee KP(b)U, who said to her in one conversation: «I will never in my life promote you to the position of the head. You must consider that you are a woman and you can never be compared to a man in your work. We need a man working here to be able to keep the gun in his hands. We are currently working exclusively on the fight against banderivtsi, and what will you do here?» [13, ark.151-152]. As a result, the readiness and ability of a person to hold a gun directed to «enemies of the people», were considered by the party management as one of the conditions for appointing him to a responsible position.

In the indicated period, the practice of official business trips of party officials to the villages which were epicenters of the rebel movement was quite widespread. It was managed in order to attract them to anti-rebellious operations carried out by the NKGB or NKVD detachments, such as: «scratchings», «raids», «ambushes», etc. In this way, - due to the words of the secretary of the Rivne regional committee of the KP(b)U V. Begma, - «people were trained to overcome their fears» [5, p.95]. We have enough documents which directly or indirectly certify the participation of secretaries, instructors, agitators of district committees of the KP(b)U, officials of other state institutions in such events. Thus, in the beginning of 1945, there appeared a series of official party documents relating the organization of the struggle with «Ukrainian nationalist gangs and the OUN underground». They, in particular, criticize, or even openly charge with inactivity separate district committees of the KP(b)U, such as the district party organization of the Dubno district of the Rivne region, «which numbers 97 Communists and is not mobilized to fight with Ukrainian-German nationalists» [12, p.128], or Gvozdetskyi district of KP(b)U in the Stanislav region. Local secretary of the district committee Vernychenko on the night of December 12 to December 13, 1945 participated in an armed group, which, having arrived «to the scene of the event at the time of the gang, did not enter into the fight with the gang» [12, p.205]. The consequence of such criticism could be the dismissal of an official from the position, moving him to the lower level of a career ladder, etc. M. Khrushchev said in his speech in January 1945 in front of party and Soviet functionaries at a regional meeting in Rivne «Whoever does not rebuild his work, he will not fit into an official's seat. And not only does not fit, because I know that some people hope that they will finally be fired. No, it will not work this way. We will fire with a crack, and here it is not about dismissal, but we must fight the enemy. The enemy, compared to us, is trained, educated and impudent – he must be cleaned, and you will see it yourself when you try. We will dismiss out of the party, we will judge you in a court for inaction»[14, ark.29].

However, in circumstances of sharp personnel deficit, such cases in the western



regions of the Ukrainian SSR in the years 1944-1946 were extremely rare, whereas the more common form of pressure on the party functionaries was psychological pressure, appeal to the duty to work, threats of punishment, public accusations of unprofessional and cowardice, etc. It should be noted that both sides the leader and the subordinate legitimated such form of relations, since it met the criteria of the management culture of the Stalinist model, where «to serve the Soviet authorities was the same as to show rather cruelty than wisdom in using human and material resources» [15, c.355].

Expanding their opinion on the level of professional training of the Party and Soviet leaders of the western regions of Ukraine, at the same meeting, M. Khrushchev emphasized that «it would be good to engage all our Communists in turn in the anti-gang operations, in order not to stop the work. Very good - let them fire. There they will hear firing, the bullets will fly near them, they will see that not everybody are killed, they will be more courageous and angrier against the bandits. I would just free Komsomol women from this» [14, ark.106]. Moreover, in order to intimidate not only the local population, but also the party-Soviet apparatus, the vast majority of which, in the opinion of the Bolshevik leader, evade the fulfillment of their official duties in part of the organization of popular mass support of the Soviet power activities, he threatened the use of various kinds of repressions against so-called «saboteurs».

According to the rhetoric of a senior official of the republic, the issue of morality and the observance of laws by the party-Soviet functionaries (the actual representatives of Soviet power on the local level) did not bother this power. They were required to act not within the legislative field, but more in the traditionally Bolshevik format of «revolutionary expediency».

It would be fair to admit that such «game rules» were not always met absolutely positively locally. Regional management often had to restrain the «aggressive ardor» of its subordinates, directing it at least partially within the framework of legality. In particular, at one of the meetings of the party apparatus of the Rivne region there was a controversy between the first secretary of the regional Committee of the KP(b)U V. Begma and the chairman of the Kozynskyi district executive committee Y. Chumak about reasonability to act in a lawful manner in case if Bolshevik activists discover a «bandit» or «deserter of the Red Army». Significantly, V. Begma made a clear statement on this regard: «You are a representative of the authorities. You do not arrest, but detain a person and deliver him/her to the authorities that have the right to arrest» [16, ark.108]. Moreover, he sharply criticized local leaders who «believe that laws are not written for them, but for fools, that this is a family matter - you can perform, you cannot perform. They do not understand that a party discipline means strictly enforce all Soviet laws» [16, ark.99].

It is worth noting that such a position of a senior regional official witnesses that among the party leaders of the Western Ukrainian region there were those who un-

derstood the necessity to form a positive image of Soviet power in the consciousness of the local population, which could be done by force of the word, belief, example of decent behavior of the nomenclature official of the regional or district level. On the other hand, the style of behavior of the party functionaries was determined by the rigidity of the selection of applicants for nomenclature positions (the presence of a «correct» biography, the appropriate features of character, verification with practical work, etc.). Successfully passing through such a «sieve», the officials felt more confident and protected from the bureaucratic point of view (as much as it was possible under the circumstances of the Stalinist totalitarian system).

Thus, one of the important components of the so-called «second Sovietization» process of the Western Ukrainian region in 1944-1946 was the replacement of the value orientations of society. This includes planting new standards of management culture of the Stalinist model. Its direct carriers were representatives of the Bolshevik-Soviet authorities, mostly exported in here from the eastern regions of the Ukrainian SSR. Their professional and personal education took place in the conditions of the Stalinist regime, where violence was understood as a norm of conduct, not its deviation. The overwhelming majority of party officials continued to use military command methods of management, showing a tendency to excessive cruelty and stiffness. The coercion of nomenclature officials for violence in 1944-1946 was a widespread practice in Western Ukrainian region, the consequence of which was the establishment of the domination of informal repressive norms over formally legal ones in the system of political power.

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